10:50 am May 28th, 2008 by wkallander

Today we talked about Casey’s non-cooperative game model for P2P networks, (using bittorrent as a specific example).  In a non-cooperative context, we talked about incentives to prevent leechers and promote sharing.  MessageReaper has the same need for incentives (the current model is based on past history) that reward current activities (like reputation).

We also talked about a stochastic form of determining the Shapley value in coalitions (from game theory).

The game theoretic incentive models may help explain the optimal configuration of covert networks that balance secrecy with efficiency.

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